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Abstract
This paper argues that there are true synthetic modal claims and that 
modal questions in philosophy are to be interpreted not in terms of 
logical necessity but in terms of synthetic necessity. I begin by sketching 
the debate about modality between logical empiricism and phenome-
nology. Logical empiricism taught us to equate analyticity and neces-
sity. The now common view is that analytic statements are necessary 
in the narrow sense but that there is also necessity in a wider sense. I 
argue against this that we should distinguish analyticity and necessity 
more strictly. 
Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), perhaps the most influential philoso-
pher of his time, wrote about his view that there are synthetic neces-
sities (‘synthetische Urtheile a priori’), a version of which I shall de-
fend in this article, ‘that we defend here a crucial element of German 
* I wish to express my gratitude to the citizens of the Free state of Bavaria for the 
“Bayerischer Habilitationsförderpreis”, which made this work possible. 
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philosophy, for which we are attacked by all nations’1. A few decades 
later a philosophical battle about synthetic necessity broke out within 
German philosophy. One party won, the other party was dispersed, 
and after a few decades it was forgotten that there was such a battle 
and that there was an opposing party. The parties in the battle were 
the two great movements in philosophy in the 20th century: logical 
empiricism and phenomenology. The logical empiricists won. Since 
then there have been a few quarrels, instigated by Quine, Putnam, 
and Kripke about the empiricist doctrine of modality, but these were 
empiricist family quarrels. The core of that doctrine is still generally 
accepted. 
I believe that the wrong party won and that this led to much confu-
sion about modality and about many modal questions in philosophy. 
In this article I shall propose an alternative to the empiricist under-
standing of modality. I shall criticise the empiricist view that ‘logical’
modality is the strongest kind of modality and that it is the kind of 
modality that is relevant for modal questions in philosophy. I shall 
even question whether it deserves to be called ‘modality’ at all. I do 
not subscribe to the whole doctrine of phenomenology, but the con-
ception of modality I shall propose shares with the phenomenolo-
gists’ view the claim that the strongest and philosophically relevant 
notion of modality is not logical but synthetic modality. Let me begin 
by sketching how we inherited ‘logical’ modality from logical empiri-
cism. 
Phenomenology and logical empiricism
The phenomenologists, like Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and 
Adolf Reinach, put forward modal claims about the world, which 
they called material or synthetic a priori (cf. Smith 1992). Examples 
1 ‘[...] daß wir [hier] einen wesentlichen Punkt deutscher Philosophie vertheidi-
gen, über den wir von allen Nationen angegriffen werden’) (Lotze 1874, 581)
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are ‘Nothing can be green and red all over’, ‘There cannot be a tone 
without a pitch’, or ‘The value of being morally good is, necessarily,
higher than the value of being pleasurable’ (Scheler 1916, 122-6; 
criticised by Schlick 1930, 24). The phenomenologists were enthusi-
astic about the realm of the material apriori. Their philosophical pro-
ject was to discover synthetic a priori truths about all sorts of things, 
such as values, rights, things and properties, speech acts such as
promising, holiness, love, etc.2
The logical empiricists found all this very mysterious, for reasons of 
epistemology. ‘A priori’, according to Kant, means independent of 
experience. So is the phenomenologists’ material a priori knowledge 
knowledge about the world (i.e. about things independent of us) that 
does not come through some kind of experience? That would be 
mysterious because how can we have knowledge without being re-
lated to the objects of this knowledge through experience? If one has 
no experience of something then one has no knowledge about it. The 
phenomenologist, however, did not mean that the material a priori 
knowledge is independent of all experience. They just meant that it 
does not come directly through sense experience, but that it comes 
through a special kind of experience, which Scheler called ‘phe-
nomenological experience’ (Scheler 1916, 68-72). Phenomenological 
experience is experience in introspection, in ‘Anschauung’ (or ‘We-
sensschau’). ‘What is given a priori is as much founded on “experi-
ence” as that which is given through experience in the sense of ob-
servation and induction. All that is given is based on experience.’3 So 
according to Scheler, we can know some things because we become 
aware of them when we think about them. We can know them sitting 
in our arm chair. For example, we can know that there cannot be a 
2 (Reinach 1913) cf. (Smith 1992); (Ingarden 1964-1974); (Otto 1917); (Hilde-
brand 1971). 
3 ‘Aus dem Gesagten ist klar, daß, was immer a priori gegeben ist, ebensowohl auf 
„Erfahrung“ überhaupt beruht wie all jenes, das uns durch „Erfahrung“ im Sinne der 
Beobachtung und der Induktion gegeben ist. Insofern beruht alles und jedes Gege-
bene auf „Erfahrung“.’ (Scheler 1916, 71)
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tone without a pitch by considering the nature of a tone. Of course, 
the logical empiricists did not like this idea better than the idea of 
knowledge without experience because it conflicts with their princi-
ple that all knowledge comes through sense experience. 
Therefore the logical empiricists rejected the phenomenologists’ ma-
terial apriori. They claimed that there are no modal truths about the 
world. So are statements like ‘There cannot be a tone without a pitch’
false? Or meaningless? That is not what the logical empiricists said, 
they avoided the implausible claim that there are no modal truths. 
But they had to employ a trick, bringing in another topic. They said, 
look there are statements like ‘Bachelors are unmarried’. They are 
called analytic statements, or tautologies. A tautology is a statement 
that is true just in virtue of its form. It is a statement whose negation 
is self-contradictory. There is nothing mysterious about tautologies. 
Now, in a philosophical coup d’etat, as if they wanted to prevent that 
anybody should ever think again that there are synthetic necessity 
statements, the logical empiricists substituted necessity by analyticity
and called it ‘logical necessity’. Let us call tautologies ‘necessary’ and 
allow no modal statements besides those claiming that something is, 
or is not, tautological. That is, interpret ‘Necessarily p’ as ‘p is ana-
lytic’ and ‘Possibly p’ as ‘p is synthetic’. The phenomenologists they
asked: ‘Are those judgements [modal statements like ‘There cannot 
be a tone without a pitch’] which you take to be synthetic and a pri-
ori really synthetic and a priori’? (Schlick 1930, 23) They argued that 
the phenomenologists’ material a priori statements are in fact ana-
lytic. They are just about concepts. As ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is 
true because of the definition of the word ‘bachelor’, so ‘There can-
not be a tone without pitch’ is true because of the definition of the 
word ‘tone’. 
Thus the logical empiricists claimed that a statement is necessary if 
and only if it is analytic, and a statement is necessary if and only if it 
is a priori. Questions whether something is possible became ques-
tions about whether some statement is analytic. Since then philoso-
phers approach modal questions in philosophy by looking for con-
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tradictions. For example, they approach the question whether back-
ward causation is possible by discussing whether ‘A at t2 caused B at 
t1 (with t1 being earlier than t2)’ is contradictory. 
The common view today is still very close to the logical empiricist 
doctrine and goes like this. Being necessary is a way of being true.
Some propositions are necessarily true, the others are contingently 
true. An example of a necessary proposition is ‘All bachelors are un-
married’; an example of a contingent proposition is ‘There are white 
moose’. This kind of necessity is logical necessity. Logical necessity is 
the strongest kind of necessity and is the kind of necessity that is 
relevant for philosophical modal questions (e.g. whether backward 
causation is possible, or whether there can be a zombie, i.e. a copy of 
my body that has no mental life). (I call this view logicism.) Following 
Kripke’ (1972) and Putnam (1975) many widened their concept of 
necessity a bit so that it encompasses ‘a posteriori necessary truths’ 
such as ‘Water is H2O’. This widened concept of necessity is some-
times called ‘broadly logical necessity’ or ‘metaphysical necessity’. 
Yet wider is the concept of ‘natural necessity’, which means being in 
accordance with the laws of nature. Natural necessity is weaker than 
logical necessity because the logically necessary is a subclass of the 
naturally necessary. 
The empiricist doctrine led us on the wrong track. We should go 
back and ask how modal questions arise and what modal claims are 
about. I shall argue that there are true synthetic, i.e. non-tautological,
necessity statements (other than statements like ‘Water is H2O’) and 
that modal questions in philosophy are not to be understood in 
terms of ‘logical necessity’. But first I have to define what an analytic 
statement is and introduce some terminology related to this. 
Analytic statements
The clearest definition of a tautological or analytic statement is in 
terms of a statement being self-contradictory. Some other definitions 
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have been devised in order to have more statements turn out ana-
lytic. For example, such definitions define an analytic statement as 
one that is true in every possible world (Lewis 1946, 57) or as one 
that is true ‘in virtue of its meaning’ (Kripke 1972, 39), and they are 
designed to include in the analytic some of the phenomenologists’ 
material a priori statements and the statements of mathematics. They 
are supposed to make these statements less mysterious because they 
make a priori knowledge turn out to be ‘merely a product of human 
concepts, meanings, definitions, or linguistic conventions’4. But once 
we reconcile ourselves with the fact that ‘There cannot be a tone 
without a pitch’ is not of the same type as ‘Bachelors are unmarried’
and is not analytic we can give a neat, quite narrow definition in 
terms of a statement being self-contradictory. 
By a self-contradictory statement I mean one which says something 
and denies it, or which speaks of something as being and not being 
in a certain way. For example, ‘Miller is married and not married’ or 
‘There is an unmarried man who is married’. 
By a tautology I mean a statement whose negation is self-
contradictory. By the negation of a statement I mean the statement 
that results from prefixing ‘It is not the case that’. For example, ‘No 
unmarried man is married’ (which Quine (1951, 22) calls ‘logically 
true’) is a tautology because ‘It is not the case that no unmarried man 
is married’, by which one says the same as by ‘There is an unmarried 
man who is married’, is self-contradictory. 
Now we have to give an account of the paradigm of an analytic 
statement, ‘Bachelors are unmarried’. It is difficult to find a belief 
that one may express with this sentence; hence one may well say that 
it has no meaning. But with some charity we can make sense of it, in 
two ways: first, it may be taken as a statement about the meaning of 
‘bachelor’; secondly, it may be taken as a tautology. 
4 For a critical discussion of such approaches to the analytic see (Bonjour 1998, ch. 
2). 
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Here is how the bachelor-sentence can be used as a statement about 
the meaning of the word ‘bachelor’. Imagine a conversation between 
John and Max where Max’s mother tongue is not English. John and 
Max agree that George is married, but nevertheless Max calls George 
a ‘bachelor’. This shows that Max does not know how the word 
‘bachelor’ is used in English. John may now reply to Max ‘Oh no, you 
are using the word ‘bachelor’ wrongly; Bachelors are unmarried’.
John here clearly uses the bachelor-sentence to state that ‘being un-
married’ is part of the meaning of ‘bachelor’, i.e. that one uses the 
word ‘bachelor’ in order to say of something, amongst other things, 
that it is unmarried. The statement is what I call a disguised mean-
ing-statement (DMS). A disguised meaning statement is one that is 
made true solely by the linkage of a certain word to its meaning and 
does not explicitly have the form ‘A means B’. 
Although this interpretation of the bachelor statement is the more 
natural one, many philosophers will say that when taken as an exam-
ple of an analytic statement the bachelor-statement is not to be inter-
preted in this way. The meaning of the words has to be taken as 
fixed, they might say. This suggests that they want to use the bache-
lor-sentence in the sense of ‘Unmarried men are unmarried’, that is, 
in the sense of a tautology. What is special about the bachelor sen-
tence is that the concept of a bachelor is a composed concept, i.e. one 
which has a nominal definition (as I will explain below). The defini-
tion is: by calling something a bachelor one says that it is an unmar-
ried man.
Now, how should we use the term ‘analytic’? One could use it just in 
the sense of ‘tautological’, but for that we have already the term ‘tau-
tological’. It is more useful to use it to refer to statements like the 
bachelor statement which are disguised, as opposed to overt, tautolo-
gies. So by an analytic statement I mean a tautology whose negation 
entails a contradiction between a composed concept and a concept that 
is a part thereof. An analytic sentence is one that can be interpreted 
as an analytic statement. 
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Analytic statements involve composed concepts. Let us have a closer 
look at them. 
Composed concepts
Some predicates, like ‘x is a bachelor’, are used to say several things 
about something; they stand for composed concepts. For example, by 
saying that something is a bachelor one says that it is a man and one 
says that it is unmarried. A composed concept is one which has a 
nominal definition, i.e. a definition of the form ‘To say of something
that it is ‘C’ is to say of it that it is P and Q ...’. It is a prerequisite for 
being a competent user of this word ‘C’ to know this definition and 
to have the concepts involved. ‘C’ has what Katz calls a ‘composi-
tional meaning’ (Katz 1998).
A composed concept has other concepts as parts. For example, the 
concept of being unmarried is a part of the concept of a bachelor.
That concept X is a part of concept Y means that ‘Y’ is used for saying 
of something, besides other things, that it is X, and there is a concept 
Z which is just like the concept of being Y except that it is neutral 
about being X. 
For each part of a composed concept we have a concept that consti-
tutes the rest of the concept. That is, if we have the composed con-
cept C of which concept P is a part, then we have an idea of what a 
thing is like for which the only reason that it is not C is that it is not 
P. We have the concept ‘C minus P’: the concept that is like C except 
that it is neutral about being P. For example, as the concept of being 
unmarried is a part of the concept of a bachelor, we have a concept of 
something for which the only reason why it is not a bachelor is that it 
is not unmarried: namely the concept of a man. (Cf. Zelaniec 1996, 
32f)
Quine’s objection against analyticity as I have defined it is this: 
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How do we find that ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’? Who 
defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the nearest dictionary, 
and accept the lexicographer’s formulation as law? Clearly this would 
be to put the cart before the horse. The lexicographer is an empirical 
scientist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts. (Quine 
1951, 24)
Quine’s objection is directed at those who are trying to reduce neces-
sity and the apriori to analyticity and for whom therefore the truth of 
an analytic statement may not be due to something contingent. To 
them he says that they cannot assume that necessity is based on defi-
nitions which lexicographers describe because these definitions are 
contingent. But as we are not looking for an empiricist account of the 
apriori but for the correct account of analytic statements, we can 
happily say that analytic statements are based on nominal definitions 
which are contingent linguistic conventions or rules. 
Synthetic necessity
Are analytic statements necessary? Contemporary textbooks take 
analytic statements to be paradigm examples of true necessary state-
ments. They say there are two kind of true statements: necessary 
truths, like ‘Bachelors are unmarried’, and contingent truths. Of 
course, if you define ‘necessary’ in this way then analytic statements 
and tautologies are necessary. Let me try out something different and 
consider synthetic modal statements, i.e. statements of the form ‘It is 
impossible that p’ (or ‘Necessarily p’, ‘It is impossible that p’, ‘It is 
possible that p’, etc.) where p is not analytic and not tautological. (By 
saying of a statement that it is a synthetic necessity, that it is syn-
thetic and necessary, or synthetically necessary, or that it is a syn-
thetic modal statement I mean that it is either itself a synthetic modal 
statement or that it can be transformed into one by adding ‘necessar-
ily’ or another modal phrase.) 
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Why should there be true synthetic modal statements? Human be-
ings have the peculiar ability to have views on something, to conceive 
of things, to construe things in their mind. They have concepts under 
which things that are independent of human minds may fall. For any 
set of concepts an existence claim can be formed which claims that 
there is something which falls under all of them. The source of neces-
sity (and possibility) lies in the fact that reality does not allow for the 
existence of all the sorts of things that human beings can construe in 
their mind. For every description of a thing the question arises 
whether the existence of such a thing is possible. We can combine 
predicates with each other arbitrarily and think and talk about a 
thing to which they all apply. The conventional rules of language do 
not allow us to say that there is a married bachelor or that there is 
something which has charge but has no charge, but they do allow us 
to say without contradiction that there is somebody who is guilty for 
something he did not do freely, or that something caused something 
which took place earlier. But it does not follow from the fact that 
conventional rules of language allow for a certain combination of 
predicates that the properties to which the predicates refer are in fact 
combinable. And even if all properties were combinable, there would 
be synthetic modal true statements too: those that say for each com-
bination of predicates that the existence of a thing to which they ap-
ply is possible. 
Take a statement of the form ‘Nothing can be A and B’ where the 
predicates ‘A’ and ‘B’ are semantically independent from each other, 
i.e. neither is a composed concept of which the other is a part (and 
‘A’ and ‘B’ are not synonyms). Neither is ‘A’ used in order to say of 
something that it is B, nor vice versa. The empiricist will say that 
‘There is nothing that is A and B’ is, if true, contingently true. It is 
false that nothing can be A and B because it is ‘logically possible’ that 
something is A and B. Of course, you may say, it may be naturally 
impossible that there is something that is A and B, but in the strict 
and philosophical sense it is possible that there is something that is A 
and B. You will say this if you take tautologies to be the paradigms of 
What Is Possible?     11
necessity. However, consider again what one could mean by asking 
‘Could there be something that is A and B?’. 
If it is true that ‘That stone over there is A’ then ‘A’ refers to a prop-
erty of the stone. The property is the object of ‘A’. If it is also true 
that ‘That shoe over there is A’, then the shoe and the stone share a 
property. They resemble each other in a certain respect. Likewise can 
‘B’ refer to a property of a thing. 
Things like stones and shoes have many properties. Assume that the 
stone is not only A but also B. In that case it is not only true that 
there is something that is A and B, but it is also true that it is possible 
that there is something that is A and B. This is what I mean by saying 
that the properties A and B, i.e. the objects of ‘A’ and ‘B’, are com-
binable. For any set of predicates, A, B, ..., which are semantically 
independent from each other, not only the question arises whether 
there is something that is A and B ..., but also the question whether 
the existence of something that is A and B ... is possible. 
We know that some properties are combinable. Perhaps all proper-
ties are combinable, but we have little reason to assume that.5 It 
seems rather implausible that there could be something that has a 
mass of 1 kg and spin ½, or that there could be something that has 
spin ½ and is jealous, or, more controversially, that there could be 
something that has a charge but no mass. 
So for any two semantically independent predicates, A and B, the 
question arises whether it is possible that there is something that is A 
and B. There is a true synthetic modal statement: either there is the 
synthetic modal truth that the existence of something that is A and B 
is possible, or there is the synthetic modal truth that the existence of 
something that is A and B is impossible. More generally, based on 
5 According to Armstrong’s (1989) ‘combinatorial theory of possibility’ all proper-
ties are combinable. However, by this he means not that there are no truths of the 
form ‘Nothing can be A and B’ but that all universals are combinable. ‘Nothing can 
be A and B’ is true, for example, if ‘A’ and ‘B’, although semantically independent, 
refer to universals that overlap. 
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the existential statement ‘There is something that is A and B’ there 
are modal statements of the following forms: 
1. Necessarily, there is something that is A and B. 
2. Necessarily, there is nothing that is A and B. (This means the same 
as ‘It is impossible that there is something which is A and B’ and 
‘Nothing can be A and B’.) 
3. Contingently, there is something that is A and B. 
4. Contingently, there is nothing that is A and B. 
5. Possibly, there is something that is A and B.
6. Possibly, there is nothing that is A and B. 
(I), ‘There is something that is A and B’, entails (5); (II), ‘There is 
nothing that is A and B’, entails (6). (1) entails (5), (2) entails (6). (3) 
entails (5), (4) entails (6). 
(2) entails and, if taken in the modal sense which is relevant here, is 
entailed by 
7. If something is A, then it is not B; and
8. All As are not B. 
One may want to hold that there are also necessary predications 
which are meaningful, i.e. statements of the form ‘a is necessarily F’
or ‘That thing over there is necessarily F’. Whether this is so depends 
on whether one can make sense of ‘It would be impossible for this 
very thing to be F’; that is, whether one can form an idea of what the 
world would have to look like if this statement were true and what it 
would have to look like if this statement were false. Note that by ‘a is 
necessarily F’, in the sense in question, it is not meant that there is a 
contradiction between ‘This is a’ and ‘This is not F’ (for example 
because the name ‘a’ is linked to a sortal, as ‘Nixon’ is linked to being 
a man). In any case, if some statements of the form ‘a is necessarily F’
are meaningful, then they are equivalent to modal existential state-
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ments, namely statements of the form ‘It is impossible that there is 
something which is this very thing and not F’. We can therefore hold 
that all synthetic modal statements are, or are equivalent to, modal 
existential statements. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe how we acquire mo-
dal knowledge and when we have justified modal beliefs. I assume 
that we know about some possibilities because we know that they are 
realized. If I know of something that is A and B, then I know that it is 
possible that there is something that is A and B. Further I assume 
that our modal intuitions make modal beliefs rational. But for the 
present purposes I do not need to take views on these matters. 
A construed example of synthetic necessity
One may object that it is mysterious how it should be impossible that 
two predicates apply to the same thing although the two predicates 
are semantically independent. I shall now construe an example of a 
synthetic necessity claim which can be seen to be not mysterious. 
Assume there is a causal feature, a property, of a thing which affects 
our senses in two ways, q and r, or which affects two different in-
struments. By a thing with a certain causal feature affecting our 
senses in a certain way I mean that if our senses are exposed to the 
thing then the thing causes an impression in us on the basis of which 
we can form a predicate, say P, and then rightly claim that the thing 
is P. A red thing, for example, causes an impression of a certain kind 
in us. In English it is said of things that cause such impressions that 
they are red. Now consider the case where one property affects our 
senses in two ways. We have two different senses that are affected by 
this property. To illustrate, the property may be the thing’s having a 
certain surface such that the property lets the thing cause a visual 
impression by reflecting light of a certain kind, and it lets the thing 
affect our sense of touch. The very same feature of the thing affects 
us in two ways. 
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Two predicates, Q and R, can be formed, based on q and r. Q and R 
are conceptually independent from each other: neither is a part of the 
other. It is not a contradiction to say that there is something which is 
Q and not R. In this case it is true that nothing can be Q without be-
ing R. It is impossible that something is Q and not R because Q and 
R are based on the same property (where I use the term ‘property’
here such that difference of predicates does not entail difference of 
properties). But ‘Something is Q and not R’ is not contradictory. 
Only a statement like ‘Something is Q and not Q’ or ‘Something is Q 
and N’ where it is part of N’s nominal definition that something 
which is N is not Q, is or entails a contradiction. No rule of language 
takes one from ‘x is Q’ to ‘x is R’. It is a synthetic necessity that some-
thing which is Q is also R. If ‘Q’ were defined such that being Q en-
tails being R, then one even could not use the predicate ‘Q’ to express 
the discovered fact that something which is Q is, always and neces-
sarily, also R. So in the scenario described it would be true to say that 
nothing can be Q without being R, whilst it is not contradictory to 
say that there is something which is Q and not R. That nothing can 
be Q without being R is not somehow due to concepts or rules of 
language. It is a real, synthetic impossibility. There is nothing myste-
rious about such an impossibility.6
6 For the example to work, at least one of the predicates, ‘Q’ or ‘R’, must have a 
meaning like Putnam’s (1975) ‘natural kind terms’. There could be a different prop-
erty which makes a thing appear q. This property might be such that a thing can 
have it without having a property in virtue of which it causes r. There could be a 
thing which causes q but not r. If causing q were sufficient for something being Q, 
then this thing would be Q but not R. It would be false that nothing can be Q without 
being R. So if my construed example is to work, then the predicate Q must be such 
that a competent user of ‘Q’ would not want to call something ‘Q’ if, although it 
causes q and therefore appears to be Q, it causes q in a way quite different from the 
way usually things cause q. Causing q is not sufficient for something to be Q. A thing 
is Q only if it is in the relevant respect objectively similar to the things that we usu-
ally rightly call Q, as something is water only if it resembles the stuff in our lakes in 
its chemical structure. If we were to discover in some region of the universe stuff 
which looks and tastes like water but turns out to be not H2O, then we would say 
that it is not water. Likewise, if we were to discover that something causes q in virtue 
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Note that how obvious it is that nothing can be Q without being R 
depends on how familiar people are with the property to which ‘Q’
and ‘R’ refer. It might be so obvious that Q and R always come to-
gether that it is in fact believed by everybody that nothing can be Q 
without being R. It might take just little thought to see that. It may be 
so obvious that one cannot imagine something being Q and not R. 
But it could also take quite an effort to see that, or it might even be 
unknown. There can be unknown necessities. It could be that it is 
conceivable that something is Q and not R.7
However, I see no strong reason for assuming that all necessities rest, 
as in my example, on a fact that different predicates refer to the very 
same causal feature of a thing. There may be other grounds for ne-
cessities and impossibilities. In any case, often we have trustworthy 
modal intuitions where we do not know the ground of the necessity 
or possibility in question. In order to be justified in holding a modal 
belief we do not need to know the ground of the truth of the belief. 
The impossibility of backward causation as an example of 
synthetic necessity
Now let us consider a real example of synthetic necessity. Is it possi-
ble that a rain dance, performed on Thursday with the intention of 
causing rain on the Monday before (at a place about which one does 
not know whether or not it was raining on Monday), causes the rain-
ing on the Monday before (besides the fact that dancing perhaps is 
of having some other property than the one ‘Q’ usually refers to, then we would say 
that the thing is not Q. 
7 The view that conceivability can ground modal knowledge has also been de-
fended recently by (Gregory 2004). However, Gregory’s discussion is based on the 
usual concept of broadly logical necessity. (Chalmers 2002) develops distinctions 
between different possible views about conceivability as a ground for modal knowl-
edge. 
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unlikely to cause rain anyway)? Or, could I ‘go back in time and 
plant a tree in a remote spot in Greenland’ (Noordhof 1998, 871)? 
Many inquire whether backward causation is possible by inquiring 
whether backward causation is ‘logically possible’, i.e. by inquiring 
whether there is a contradiction in every description of a case of 
backward causation. They equate the claim that backward causation 
is impossible with the claim that ‘A cause is earlier than its effect’ is 
analytic. 
It is not analytic that a cause is earlier than its effect, because ‘cause’
is not a composed concept a part of which is that a cause is earlier 
than its effect. If it were, then we would have a concept that is just 
like the concept of a cause except that it is neutral about the temporal 
order of events, as we have a concept that is like the concept of a 
bachelor except that it is neutral about being married (namely the 
concept of a man). But we do not. The concept of a cause itself is 
neutral about the temporal order of cause and effect. That is why 
somebody who dances on Thursday in order to cause rain on the 
Monday before correctly says why he dances by saying ‘I dance in 
order to cause rain three days ago’. The trouble with this is not that 
he contradicts himself but that, as most of us believe, it is impossible 
that something causes something which takes place earlier. 
Whether backward causation is possible depends on whether it is 
possible that there is an ordered pair of events which resembles the 
paradigm cases in the relevant respect and where the first event is 
later than the second. The disagreement between us and the rain 
dancer is not one about the concept of a cause. It is a disagreement 
about a modal fact, and that is not a disagreement about concepts. It 
is wrongheaded to try to answer a modal question by inquiring 
whether there is a contradiction in the description of the situation 
whose possibility is under consideration. The question whether 
something is possible arises only if its description is consistent. The 
logical empiricists put us on the wrong track. 
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‘Water is H2O’
The logical empiricists’ assumption that necessary statements are a 
priori was challenged by Kripke’s and Putnam’s claim that ‘Water is 
H2O’ is necessary (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975). The reason for this 
claim is that ‘water’ is what I call a paradigm-based concept: whether
such a concept applies to something depends on whether the thing
resembles objectively the paradigm cases in a certain respect that one 
need not know in order to have the concept. ‘Water’ is a paradigm-
based concept because something that looks like water but has a 
chemical structure other than H2O and therefore does not resemble 
the paradigm cases in the relevant respect is not water, according to 
Putnam.8 Is ‘Necessarily, water is H2O’ therefore an example of a 
true synthetic modal claim? I think in one sense it is one, though not 
a very interesting one, but in three other senses it is not. 
Here are three senses of the water-statement with which there is no
true synthetic modal claim here. First, ‘Water is H2O’ can be used to 
express the belief that the stuff in our rivers and lakes is H2O. It is 
certainly not necessary that the stuff in our rivers and lakes is H2O, 
because the earth could be totally similar to how it is now, except 
that the stuff in our rivers and lakes is XYZ. The claim that water is 
necessarily H2O, in this sense, is not true. 
Secondly, ‘Water is H2O’ can be used for saying that nowadays one 
rightly calls something ‘water’ only if it is H2O. The sentence is then 
used for reporting how certain words are used. But then ‘Water is 
H2O’ is not necessary, because, of course, ‘water’ could be used quite 
differently. 
Thirdly, ‘Water is H2O’ can be used for introducing the term ‘water’, 
i.e. for giving a definition. One can state that one is going to use the 
term ‘water’ to refer to H2O and in the same sense as ‘H2O’, without 
8 For a thorough discussion of ‘Water is H2O’ see (Chalmers 1996, 56-65) or 
(Jackson 2000, 39 and 46-52). Both authors argue that ‘water’ has two different in-
tensions. 
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being committed to any view about what the stuff in our rivers and 
lakes is like and how other people use ‘water’. But then ‘Water is 
H2O’ is not used to make a statement at all. It is used to make a 
nominal definition, and nominal definitions in itself are neither true 
nor false. Also here we have no sense of ‘Necessarily, water is H2O’ in 
which that modal claim is true. 
I used to hold that there is no other usage of ‘Water is H2O’ and that 
there is no true modal statement here. But I now think that I have to 
admit that, as long as ‘water’ is not used in the sense of ‘H2O’, it is a 
true modal synthetic statement that ‘Nothing can be water without 
being H2O’. But it is not an interesting one because nowadays water 
is defined as H2O and therefore there is no question whether some-
thing can be water without being H2O, and before it was known that 
water is H2O this was not a question either; the question then was 
just: what is water? That is, what is the chemical structure of the stuff 
in our rivers and lakes, and that is not a modal question. 
Entailment
Many assume that to say that A entails B is to say that it is logically 
impossible that A and not B (e.g. Chalmers 1996, 70). By this they 
mean that A entails B if ‘A and not B’ is self-contradictory, and some 
authors may also want to hold that there are cases where it is logi-
cally impossible that A and not B although ‘A and not B’ is not self-
contradictory; for example, they may want to hold that it is logically 
impossible that something is water and not H2O.9 I suggest that we 
9 Swinburne forms a notion of entailment that is wider than analytic entailment by 
saying: ‘a sentence r1 minimally entails a sentence r2 if the rules of public language 
are recognized by most speakers of the language to be such (when it is suggested to 
them) that a speaker of r1 in the given context is ‘committed’ to r2 in the context—in 
this sense that the speaker of r1 is thereby also taken to have affirmed r2’ (Swinburne 
1994, 107). My point is that this covers very different pairs of sentences, where in 
some cases ‘r1&~r2’ is self-contradictory and in some cases ‘r1&~r2’ is consistent 
but it is obvious that if r1 is true, then r2 is true too. 
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better restrict entailment to cases where the negation of what is en-
tailed contradicts that which entails it, i.e. to what Katz (1998, 556)
calls ‘analytic entailment’. To say that A entails B is to say that ‘A and 
not B’ is self-contradictory. Entailment is not a matter of modal rela-
tions between propositions but a matter of contradictions. Of course,
by stipulation we could also define: A entails B if, and only if, ‘A and 
not B’ is self-contradictory or it is (synthetically) impossible that A 
and not B. But this would be a very wide, inhomogeneous notion of 
entailment. We better distinguish between ‘‘A and not B’ is self-
contradictory’ and ‘It is impossible that A and not B’. 
Possible worlds
You may wonder why I have not mentioned ‘possible worlds’ thus 
far. It has become common to say ‘a proposition is necessary if it 
holds at all possible worlds’ (Chellas 1980, 3). For us, however, talk of 
possible worlds is of no use because it does not clarify what is meant 
by necessity and what the relationship between being necessary and 
being self-contradictory is. It does not clarify whether by a proposi-
tion being necessary it is meant that the negation of the proposition 
is self-contradictory. Usually it is assumed that propositions whose 
negation is self-contradictory and perhaps propositions of the type 
‘Water is H2O’ are the ones that are true at no possible world. You 
can settle this matter by talk of possible worlds only if you indicate
which possible worlds there are by specifying what you mean by 
‘possible’. But if you have done that adding talk of ‘worlds’ does not 
help you any further to clarify the relationship between modality and 
being self-contradictory. 
What is typical for a statement like ‘Unmarried men are unmarried’
is that its negation is self-contradictory. To say that it is true at all 
possible worlds is at best no further elucidation and at worst, if there 
are no possible worlds or if it is left unclear what they are, wrong or 
mystifying. 
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Could one hold that true synthetic modal statements are true because 
of what is the case in other ‘possible worlds’? If this is to be not just a 
paraphrase for saying that something is possible, then it has to be 
understood as the claim that there really are these other worlds and 
that what is possible is a matter of what is the case there. That is im-
plausible because whether something is possible does not depend on 
whether it is the case, whether here or elsewhere. Further, the con-
strued example of a synthetic necessity which I gave above is an ex-
ample of a synthetic modal statement that is true not because of what 
is the case in other worlds but because there are two predicates refer-
ring to the same property. 
What is the strongest kind of necessity? 
The common view has it that logical necessity is the strongest kind of 
necessity and that it is the kind of necessity that is relevant for phi-
losophical modal questions. I call this view logicism. Let me argue 
that logical necessity is not stronger than synthetic necessity. The 
argument for the view that logical necessity is the strongest kind of 
necessity is that all other classes of possibilities are subsets of the 
class of logical possibilities. Chalmers (1996, 37) argues, for example, 
that everything that is ‘naturally possible’ is also ‘logically possible’, 
but not everything that is logically possible is also naturally possible: 
‘The class of natural possibilities is therefore a subset of the class of 
logical possibilities’. 
I reply that logical necessity, in the sense of being tautological, is not
stronger than synthetic necessity because nothing that is logically 
necessary is synthetically necessary, and vice versa. Logicists assume 
that there is a range of kinds of necessity the strongest of which is 
logical necessity. Perhaps it is right to say that the necessity in ‘One 
cannot be guilty for something one did not do freely’ is stronger than 
the necessity in ‘There cannot be two masses which do not attract 
each other’. But if there is such a scale of strengths of necessity, logi-
cal necessity is not on this scale because logically necessary state-
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ments are not at all about whether the world could be as it is de-
scribed in a certain consistent statement. Logical necessity and syn-
thetic necessity cannot be compared in strength because no logically 
necessary statement is synthetically necessary, and no synthetically 
necessary statement is logically necessary. 
Whether you will say that logical necessity is the strongest kind of 
necessity depends on whether you form and use a concept of possi-
bility, called for example ‘natural possibility’ or ‘metaphysical possi-
bility’, that encompasses logical possibilities as well as synthetic pos-
sibilities, and, correspondingly, a concept of necessity that encom-
passes logical necessities as well as synthetic necessities. If you base 
your claim about what is the strongest kind of necessity on such a 
concept, then you will say that logical necessity is the strongest kind 
of necessity, because then the class of logical necessities is a subset of 
the class of natural necessities, and the class of logical possibilities is 
a subset of the class of natural possibilities. 
My objection against this is that such a concept of natural necessity is 
a very mixed bag. To ask about a statement whether its negation is 
self-contradictory is very different from asking about a statement 
whether, although its negation is consistent, it describes something 
possible. The reason wherefore it is true that bachelors are unmar-
ried is that one uses the word ‘bachelor’ in order to say of something 
(among other things) that it is unmarried, whereas, as I have argued 
above, the reason wherefore it is true (if it is true) that a cause is al-
ways earlier than its effect is not that one uses ‘x is a cause of y’ in 
order to say (among other things) that x is earlier than y. I therefore 
suggest that logical necessities and synthetic necessities do not have 
in common what would make it adequate to subsume them under 
one concept of natural necessity on the basis of which one could say 
that logical necessity is the strongest kind of necessity. Properly 
speaking ‘logical necessity’ is not a kind of necessity, and ‘logical pos-
sibility’ is not a kind of possibility. We better reserve the term ‘neces-
sity’ for synthetic necessity, and the term ‘possibility’ for synthetic 
possibility. Instead of ‘logically necessary’ we can say ‘tautological’; 
instead of ‘logically possible’ we can say ‘consistent’. Consistency is 
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not a kind of possibility but a precondition of the truth of modal 
statements as it is a precondition of the truth of any statement. 
David Chalmers argues against a concept of modality that is not re-
ducible to a statement’s being contradictory that a believer in such 
modality ‘must embrace a modal dualism, with distinct primitive 
modalities of logical and metaphysical possibility, neither of which is 
reducible to the other’ (Chalmers 2002, 194). My claim, defended 
above, that a concept that includes logical as well as synthetic modal-
ity would be a mixed bag is in line with this claim of Chalmers, that 
having both kinds of modality would be a modal dualism. I too want 
to avoid modal dualism. But I have suggested that to avoid it we 
should not, as Chalmers does, assimilate possibility to ‘logical possi-
bility’ but rather exclude ‘logical possibility’ from the concept of pos-
sibility. 
How to carve up the cake
Compare the common way of defining and drawing the lines be-
tween analyticity, logical necessity, necessity, etc. with what I have
recommended. The common (empiricist, logicist) view, stereotyped,
is as follows. 
A tautology, or analytic statement, is defined as a statement whose 
negation is self-contradictory. Many authors squeeze some examples 
which the phenomenologists took to be synthetic into the class of the 
analytic because they think these examples would be mysterious if 
they were synthetic. For example, according to the common view (as 
defended by Schlick 1930) statements like ‘Nothing can be green and 
red all over’ and ‘Every tone has a pitch’, and also mathematical 
statements are analytic (whereas I would take the phenomenologists’ 
view that they are synthetic). Tautologies, according to the common 
view, are paradigm examples of necessary statements. They exhibit 
the strongest kind of necessity: logical necessity. The logical empiri-
cists equated being necessary with being tautological. In the seventies 
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then many widened their concept of logical necessity by taking Put-
nam’s and Kripke’s ‘Water is H2O’ to be necessary: ‘broadly logi-
cally’ or ‘metaphysically’ necessary. The common view distinguishes 
logical necessity, necessity in the strongest sense, and also ‘broadly 
logical or metaphysical necessity’, from ‘natural’ or ‘causal’ necessity
(Plantinga 1974, 2; Chalmers 1996, 34-38). What is not logically nec-
essary may still be naturally necessary. Natural necessity is weaker 
than logical necessity; what is logically necessary is also naturally 
necessary but not vice versa. What is naturally necessary depends on 
what the laws of nature are.10
Against this view, I have proposed the concept of synthetic necessity, 
which excludes tautologies from being necessary. I define analyticity 
as the logicists do, but in practice I take fewer cases to be analytic 
because I accept as disguised tautologies only statements with com-
posed concepts (as I have defined it), and not statements like ‘A 
cause is earlier than its effect’ or ‘What is coloured is red’ which logi-
cists take to be tautological because they want to accept them but 
want to avoid accepting synthetic modal statements. A tautological 
statement I define as one whose negation is a self-contradiction. As a 
tautology is something very different from a true (synthetic) neces-
sity statement my concept of necessity is the concept of synthetic 
necessity, which excludes tautologies. In contrast to the logicist I do 
not distinguish between different kinds of necessity and possibility.
Philosophical modal questions, such as whether backward causation 
is possible, are to be interpreted in terms of synthetic modality. 
10 (Fine 2002) takes logical necessity to be a kind of necessity and argues that natu-
ral necessity and modal necessity are wholly distinct from metaphysical necessity. 
My mixed bag objection applies also to Fine’s concept of metaphysical necessity. 
Against Fine I believe in modal monism, but I cannot defend this fully here. Once we 
kick out tautologies from the class of the necessary we have just one kind of modal-
ity. In my article ... I defend a non-Humean theory of causation with connexions but 
without necessity. 
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Examples of modal questions in philosophy
There are many areas where we could come to new results if we in-
terpreted modal questions not in terms of logical but in terms of syn-
thetic modality. Here are some examples. 
Materialists in the philosophy of mind hold that the mental super-
venes on the physical, i.e. that there could not be a copy of my body 
that does not give rise to a mental life as I have it. Chalmers (1996, 
94-99 and 2002, 195-199) rejects materialism because it is logically 
possible that there is a zombie, i.e. a copy of my body without mental 
life: ‘I can discern no contradiction in the description [of a zombie]’
(96). If I am right the argument has to be reconsidered. The question 
is not whether a zombie is logically possible, but whether it is syn-
thetically possible (as I argue in my...). The materialist has to defend 
not logical supervenience but synthetic supervenience. 
Another argument for dualism depends on a modal claim. Richard 
Swinburne (1997, ch. 8) argues: it is logically possible that I shall con-
tinue to exist after my death; if that is to be possible I need to have a 
soul; therefore I have a soul. ‘From the mere logical possibility of my 
continued existence there follows the actual fact that there is now 
more to me than my body.’ (Swinburne 1997, 154) The controversial 
premise here is the one that it is possible that I shall continue to exist 
after my death. If I am right the question is not whether this is logi-
cally possible but whether it is synthetically possible. The materialist 
should hold that although it is consistently describable that I shall 
continue to exist after my death it is in fact impossible.11
J.N. Findlay, in his famous article ‘Can God’s Existence be Dis-
proved’ (1948), proposes a modal argument against the existence of 
God. If there is a God, then he exists necessarily, because if he merely 
11 Swinburne’s premise is that it is ‘logically possible’ that I shall continue to exist 
after my death, but in my view what he writes in support of this premise shows not 
only that this is consistently describable, but, through employing modal intuitions, it 
supports also the claim that it is really, i.e. synthetically, possible that I shall continue 
to exist. 
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happened to exist he would not be worthy of worship and he would 
not be the Lord of everything. But it is logically possible that there is 
no God. Therefore there is no God. This argument is a consequence 
of the logical empiricists’ coup d’etat. The traditional thesis that God 
exists necessarily (if he exists at all) is rejected also by many theists 
today because they interpret it in terms of logical necessity, and it is 
quite obvious that ‘God exists’ is not logically necessary. They say 
that God’s existence is not logically necessary, but it may be neces-
sary in some weaker sense. If I am right the claim that God exists 
necessarily is to be interpreted not in terms of logical necessity but in 
terms of synthetic necessity, which is the only and the strongest kind 
of necessity. 
Laws of nature are logically contingent; their negation is not self-
contradictory. This is generally equated with the claim that the laws 
of nature could be different, or that they could change. The logicists 
cannot even meaningfully ask whether they are necessary in the 
weaker sense, i.e. naturally necessary, because that is defined in terms 
of ‘according to the laws of nature’. If there is some truth in what I 
have argued in this article, then this is the wrong approach. Of 
course laws of nature are logically contingent. But this does not mean 
that they are contingent, i.e. that they could be different or that they 
could change and that the existence of a universe is possible which 
totally resembles our universe but in which, for example, the gravita-
tional force between bodies is weaker. Whether the laws of nature 
could be different is a matter of synthetic modality. 
So we need to liberate ourselves from the legacy of logical empiricism 
and reconsider all those modal questions which are now generally 
interpreted in terms of ‘logical necessity’. Just call tautologies ‘tau-
tologies’ and not ‘necessary’, and when you face a modal question 
think not about what is consistent but about what is possible. 
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